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1Caching UAV Assisted Secure Transmission in Hyper-Dense
Networks Based on Interference Alignment
Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, Fen Cheng, F. Richard Yu, Senior Member, IEEE, Jie Tang, Member, IEEE,
Yunfei Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, Guan Gui, Member, IEEE, and Hikmet Sari, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can help small-
cell base stations (SBSs) offload traffic via wireless backhaul
to improve coverage and increase rate. However, the capacity
of backhaul is limited. In this paper, UAV assisted secure
transmission for scalable videos in hyper-dense networks via
caching is studied. In the proposed scheme, UAVs can act as
SBSs to provide videos to mobile users in some small cells. To
reduce the pressure of wireless backhaul, UAVs and SBSs are both
equipped with caches to store videos at off-peak time. To facilitate
UAVs, a single antenna is equipped at each UAV and thus, only
the precoding matrices of SBSs should be cooperatively designed
to manage interference by exploiting the principle of interference
alignment. On the other hand, the SBSs replaced by UAVs will
be idle. Thus, in order to guarantee secure transmission, the idle
SBSs can be further exploited to generate jamming signal to
disrupt eavesdropping. The jamming signal is zero-forced at the
legitimate users through the precoding of the idle SBSs, without
affecting the legitimate transmission. The feasibility conditions of
the proposed scheme are derived, and the secrecy performance is
analyzed. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Caching, interference alignment, physical layer
security, small-cell networks, unmanned aerial vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 5G mobile networks, data traffic will increase unprece-
dentedly. In order to meet the increasing data demands, small-
cell networks will be widely deployed, which can achieve
much higher throughput and energy efficiency [1]. However,
owing to the dense deployment of small-cell base stations
(SBSs), the interference between users becomes more serious,
which may lead to performance degradation. Thus, it is very
important to properly manage interference to further improve
the performance of small-cell networks [2]. As an emerging
technique for interference management in wireless networks,
interference alignment (IA) can be utilized in hyder-dense
small-cell networks [3]–[8]. In addition, the security of small-
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cell networks is also a critical issue, which has attracted
significant attention [9]–[14].
To alleviate the pressure of small cells and reduce the cost
of densely deployed SBSs, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
can be exploited to assist small cells in providing high-speed
transmission due to their low cost and high mobility. UAV-
aided wireless networks can establish wireless connections
without infrastructure, realize larger wireless coverage, and
achieve higher transmission rate. Thus, a number of research
works on this topic have been done in recent years [15]–
[22]. In [15], three typical cases of utilization for UAV-
aided wireless communications were summarized by Zeng
et al., including UAV-aided ubiquitous coverage, UAV-aided
relaying, and UAV-aided information dissemination. In [16],
Gupta et al. discussed the key issues of routing and protocol in
UAV-aided communications. A sub-modular game perspective
of energy consumption optimization of UAV-aided network
was provided in [17] by Koulali et al. In [18], Sharma et
al. proposed a user demand based network model to achieve
prolonged connectivity, bigger capacity and better reliability
in heterogeneous networks assisted by UAVs. In [19], a spiral
algorithm was proposed by Lyu et al. to minimize the number
of required UAV-mounted mobile base stations to cover all
the ground terminals. Zeng et al. optimized the throughput for
UAV-aided mobile relaying system by transmitting appropriate
source/relay power along with selecting appropriate relay
trajectory in [20]. While in [21], energy-efficient network was
achieved through optimizing the UAV’s trajectory by Zeng and
Zhang. In addition, in small-cell networks, UAVs can serve as
mobile base stations to assist SBSs in offloading data traffic
via wireless backhaul [22].
However, UAVs can provide data transmission only by
connecting to the macro-cell base station (MBS) via wireless
backhaul. Due to the limited capacity of wireless backhaul, the
transmission rate by UAVs is also limited, which will degrade
the quality of service (QoS) when mobile users are crowded.
To solve this problem, caches can be equipped at UAVs to store
the popular contents at off-peak period [23], and thus, when
the users’ requested contents exist at local caches of UAVs,
they can be delivered to the users directly without wireless
backhaul at peak period. Thus, the load via limited wireless
backhaul can be reduced, which makes UAVs more feasible.
In cache-aided wireless networks, the local caches proac-
tively fetch the popular files from the core network during
off-peak time [24]–[27], and the users can obtain the required
contents from the edge nodes directly at peak time, e.g.,
SBSs, instead of the core network. Thus, the traffic at the
backhaul can be shifted from the peak time to the off-
2peak time, and the pressure of backhaul will be significantly
relieved [28]. In addition, caching at the edge of networks
makes the data traffic much closer to the mobile users. Thus,
the transmission latency can be reduced, and the quality of
experience for users will be enhanced. Furthermore, caching
can also be utilized in interference networks, especially, IA-
based networks, to facilitate the interference management and
improve the performance [7], [8], [29], [30]. In [29], each
file was divided into some nonoverlapping subfiles cached
at different transmitters, and then, those subfiles would be
transmitted to users cooperatively by managing interference
effectively with IA gain. Deghel et al. demonstrated that
caching can provide benefits for IA networks in [30]. In [7],
caching and computing were jointly utilized by Zhao et al., to
simplify the topology of IA networks, reduce backhaul load,
and thus improve the throughput. In [8], power allocation was
researched by Cheng et al. in cached-aided small-cell networks
with limited backhaul.
Motivated by the above works, in this paper, UAVs with
caching are utilized as mobile base stations (BSs) to provide
video streaming to the mobile users along with SBSs. To
effectively eliminate the interference between users, IA is
exploited in the proposed scheme. In addition, to guarantee
the secure transmission, the idle SBSs replaced by UAVs
are further utilized to generate jamming signal to disrupt
the potential eavesdropping, without affecting the legitimate
transmission. The key contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows.
 To the best of our knowledge, there are very few works
on UAV-aided wireless networks with caching [23]. Thus,
in this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework
for hyper-dense small-cell networks assisted by caching
UAVs, analyze its feasibility, and discuss the secure
transmission.
 To relieve the transmission pressure of SBSs, UAVs are
utilized to provide data traffic to mobile users cooper-
atively with SBSs, due to their lower cost and higher
mobility. Caches are equipped at UAVs to store popular
files in advance, which can relieve the pressure on the
wireless backhaul at peak time significantly.
 A single antenna is equipped at each UAV to facilitate
its transmission, and the idea of IA is leveraged to
perform interference management in the network through
designing the precoding matrices of SBSs cooperatively.
The feasibility conditions of the proposed scheme are also
derived.
 Another key issue for the UAV aided small-cell network
is the secure transmission. In this paper, the idle SBSs re-
placed by UAVs are further utilized to generate jamming
signal to disrupt the potential eavesdropping, which will
not affect the transmission of the legitimate network. The
security performance of the proposed scheme is analyzed.
In addition, some issues for adopting IA in our proposed
scheme are discussed as follows.
(1) The performance of IA will degrade at low SNRs, due
to the fact that it only concentrates on interference, instead
of noise. First, to make it more practical to be utilized at
Fig. 1. UAV assisted secure transmission in hyper-dense networks via
caching.
low SNRs, plenty of research has been done to improve its
performance [31]–[34]. In addition, although the performance
of IA is not optimal at low SNRs, it will instruct the optimal
transceiver design of MIMO interference network, according
to its feasibility conditions [35], i.e., the optimal MIMO
transceiver design scheme can achieve reliable performance
only when the feasibility conditions of IA can be satisfied.
Last, although we adopt IA to achieve interference manage-
ment in this manuscript, the framework can also be achieved
by other interference management techniques, e.g., optimal
transceiver design [36].
(2) Channel state information (CSI) estimation errors will
degrade the performance IA obviously. Nevertheless, there
have been a lot of research efforts focusing on this aspect [6],
[37]–[39], e.g., CSI overhead reduction, limited quantization,
channel prediction, blind IA, etc. These achievements can be
further combined with our proposed scheme to overcome the
CSI problem, which is not the main task of this paper. In
addition, only one single antenna is equipped at each UAV,
which does not need the CSI knowledge. Thus, the challenge
for the estimation of CSI for mobile UAVs can be avoided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model is described. In Section III, the interference
management scheme for the caching UAV assisted hyper-dense
network with jamming signal is proposed, and its feasibility
conditions are derived in Section IV. In Section V, the security
performance of the proposed scheme when there exists an
eavesdropper is analyzed. Simulation results are presented
in Section VI, followed by conclusions and future work in
Section VII.
Notation: Ay is the conjugate transpose of matrix A. IN
represents N  N indentity matrix. CN (a;A) represents the
complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance
matrix A. vi(A) and A?l are the eigenvector corresponding to
the ith smallest eigenvalue and the lth column of matrix A,
respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a UAV-assisted hyper-dense small-cell network via
caching, as shown in Fig. 1, in which one MBS, K SBSs and
3K corresponding mobile users, operate in a specific frequency
band1. The MBS is connected to the core network via optical
backhaul. In addition, there exist A (A < K) UAVs served
as mobile BSs, which are connected to the MBS via wireless
backhaul to alleviate the data transmission load of SBSs and
achieve higher transmission rate. However, due to limited
batteries, limited wireless backhaul and high mobility, some
special properties of UAVs are considered in the network as
follows.
 Only one single antenna is equipped at each UAV2, due
to the fact that the scattering in UAV environment is
inadequate, the size, weight and power of UAVs are
limited, and CSI cannot be obtained easily at UAVs [15].
 According to the DoF requirement of multi-input and
multi-output (MIMO) system, only one data stream can
be transmitted by the UAV owing to the single antenna.
 UAVs do not need the CSI knowledge, due to the fact
that no precoding is needed with single antenna.
 Caches are equipped at UAVs in order to alleviate the load
of wireless backhaul and save energy. Popular videos can
be proactively cached at UAVs during off-peak period or
when replenishing batteries on the ground.
 Rotary wing UAVs are adopted, which can stay stationary
in the air when offloading data, and the transmit power
of UAVs cannot be neglected due to the limited batteries,
especially when they are far from terrestrial users. Thus,
UAVs should fly close enough to the corresponding users
when offloading.
To make the caching of videos at UAVs and SBSs more
effective, a special video caching strategy is adopted. In
this strategy, each video file is divided into two layers, i.e.,
base layer (BL) and enhancement layer (EL) [40]. When a
user requires standard-definition video streaming, only the BL
segment of the video file should be transmitted. When the
user need high-definition video streaming, both the EL and
BL segments should be delivered. To reduce the load and save
caching resource, only EL segments are cached at UAVs, while
at SBSs, both BL and EL segments are cached. The SBSs
can support the BL transmission, and the UAVs only help
to offload data traffic when high-definition video streaming
is required. Assume that only one layer of the video can
be transmitted to each user within each time slot, and thus,
at a specific time slot, UAVs can replace SBSs to serve the
corresponding users with EL segments in some of the small
cells. In this paper, we only consider a special scenario for
video streaming transmission. Actually, we can easily extend
our proposed scheme to some more general cases when the
SBSs and UAVs have cached totally different contents.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the 1st user to the
Ath user require EL segments from their corresponding UAVs,
and the remaining (K A) users want to obtain BL segments
from their corresponding (K A) SBSs at a specific time slot.
1We assume that only one active user exists in a certain frequency band of
each small cell. Nevertheless, more users can be accommodated by orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access or other ways, which is beyond the scope
of this paper.
2The proposed scheme can be easily extended to the case when each UAV
is also equipped with multiple antennas.
Fig. 2. Interference management for UAV assisted small-cell networks with
jamming signal.
Thus, the 1st to the Ath SBSs are idle at the time slot. To
fully utilize the resource and guarantee secure transmission,
these A SBSs are utilized to generate jamming signal to
disrupt potential eavesdropping, without affecting legitimate
transmission. Besides, we assume that Mjam antennas are
active at each jamming SBS. For the remaining lth SBS,
M antennas are active, and d independent data streams are
transmitted to its corresponding user, l = A+1; A+2; :::;K.
Each mobile user is equipped with N antennas.
When the transmission is performed in the hyper-dense
small-cell network, interference between users may become
much more serious. Thus, IA is exploited to effectively man-
age the interference in the small-cell network, as illustrated
in Fig. 2. When IA is performed, no precoding matrices are
needed at UAVs as they only have a single antenna. The
received signal at the ith user served by UAV can be expressed
as
y[i] =u[i]yh[ii]x[i] +
AX
a=1;a 6=i
u[i]yh[ia]x[a]
+
KX
k=A+1
u[i]yH[ik]V[k]x[k] + u[i]yz[i];
(1)
where i = 1; 2; : : : ; A. h[ia] is the N  1 channel coefficient
vector between the ath UAV and the ith user, each entity
of which is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
following CN (0; 1). Similarly, H[ik] is the N M channel
coefficient matrix between the kth SBS and the ith user.
V[k] is the M  d precoding matrix of the kth SBS with
V[k]V[k]y = Id. u[i] is the N  1 decoding vector of the
ith user with u[i]u[i]y = 1. x[i] is the signal transmitted by
the ith UAV with power P1. x[k] is the signal vector that
consists of d independent data streams with power P2. z[i]
is the N  1 additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector
with distribution CN (0; 2IN ) at the ith user, where 2 is the
noise power at each antenna. The received signal of the lth
4user served by SBS can be expressed as
y[l] =U[l]yH[ll]V[l]x[l] +
AX
a=1
U[l]yh[la]x[a]
+
KX
k=A+1
k 6=l
U[l]yH[lk]V[k]x[k] + U[l]yz[l];
(2)
where l = A + 1; A + 2; : : : ;K. U[l] is the N  d decoding
matrix of the lth user, with U[l]U[l]y=Id.
We also assume that there exists a passive eavesdropper with
Ne antennas, which tries to eavesdrop the legitimate transmis-
sion of the network. The received signal at the eavesdropper
without considering the jamming from SBSs can be denoted
as
ye =
AX
i=1
h[i]e x
[i] +
KX
l=A+1
H[l]e V
[l]x[l] + ze; (3)
where h[i]e is the Ne  1 channel coefficient vector between
the ith UAV and the eavesdropper. H[l]e is the NeM channel
coefficient matrix between the lth SBS and the eavesdropper.
ze is the Ne1 AWGN vector with distribution CN (0; 2INe)
at the eavesdropper.
Remark 1: Despite of the mobility of UAVs, they will stop
moving when performing transmission to the users. Thus, IA
is suitable to be leveraged in the UAV assisted hyper-dense
networks, due to the slow change of CSI.
III. UAV ASSISTED HYPER-DENSE NETWORKS WITH
JAMMING SIGNAL
In this section, the interference management scheme is first
proposed for the UAV assisted hyper-dense network without
jamming signal. Then, the jamming signal is designed without
affecting the legitimate transmission. Finally, an algorithm is
proposed to fulfill the scheme.
A. Interference Management in the UAV Assisted Network
From Section II, we know that the recovered signal of the
mobile user can be expressed as (1) or (2) without considering
jamming signal when IA is performed. In order to effectively
eliminate the interference between users, the precoding and
decoding matrices should be cooperatively designed. In par-
ticular, the precoding of UAVs need not be considered due to
single antenna equipped. Thus, at the ith user, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A,
the interference from all the SBSs should be constrained
by their precoding matrices into the same subspace of the
interference from UAVs. Then, all the interference can be
eliminated perfectly using its decoding vector u[i] to recover
the desired signal, based on (4) and (5). Similarly, at the lth
user, l = A + 1; A + 1; : : : ;K, the interference from other
SBSs should be constrained by the precoding matrices into
the same subspace of the interference from UAVs. Then, all
the interference can be eliminated perfectly by its decoding
matrix U[l] to recover the desired signal, based on (6) and
(7). Therefore, in order to perfectly eliminate the interference
between users, the following conditions (4)-(9) should be
satisfied for i = 1; 2; : : : ; A and l = A + 1; A + 2; : : : ;K
according to the idea of IA:
u[i]yh[ia]=0; 8a=1; 2; : : : ; A; a 6= i: (4)
u[i]yH[ik]V[k]=0; 8k=A+1; A+2; : : : ;K: (5)
U[l]yh[la]=0; 8a=1; 2; : : : ; A: (6)
U[l]yH[lk]V[k]=0; 8k=A+1; A+2; : : : ;K; k 6= l: (7)
u[i]yh[ii] 6= 0: (8)
rank

U[l]yH[ll]V[l]

=d: (9)
When (4)-(7) can be met, the conditions (8) and (9) will
be satisfied almost certainly due to the fact that there is not
any special structure of the channel matrices. Thus, when (4)-
(7) can be solved by the precoding and decoding matrices
cooperatively, the proposed scheme will be feasible, and the
interference can be perfectly eliminated. The received signal
of the ith user served by UAV in (1) can be simplified as
y[i] = h
[i]
x[i]+ z[i]; (10)
where i = 1; 2; : : : ; A, h
[i] , u[i]yh[ii] and z[i] , u[i]yz[i]. The
received signal of the lth user in (2) can be updated as
y[l] = H[l]x[l]+ z[l]; (11)
where l = A + 1; A + 2; : : : ;K, H[l] , U[l]yH[ll]V[l] and
z[l] , U[l]yz[l]. Thus, the sum rate of the small-cell network
can be expressed as
Rsum=
AX
i=1
log2
1+P12 h[i]h[i]y
+ KX
l=A+1
log2
Id+ P2d2H[l]H[l]y
: (12)
B. Design of Jamming Signal
When there exists a potential eavesdropper, the idle SBSs
that replaced by UAVs can be further utilized to generate jam-
ming signal to disrupt the eavesdropping. Then, the received
signal of the kth user in (10) and (11) can be rewritten as
by[i]=h[i]x[i]+AX
j=1
u[i]yG[ij] [j]x[j]jam+z
[i]; i=1; 2; : : : ; A; (13)
by[l]=H[l]x[l]+ AX
j=1
U[l]yG[lj] [j]x[j]jam+z
[l]; l=A+1; A+2; : : : ;K;
(14)
where j = 1; 2; : : : ; A, G[kj] is the N  Mjam channel
coefficient matrix between the jth SBS and the kth user,  [j]
is the Mjamdjam unitary precoding matrix of the jth SBS,
and x[j]jam is the jamming vector that consists of djam data
streams with transmit power Pjam.
From (13) and (14), we can see that the jamming signal will
affect the legitimate transmission of the small-cell network,
and thus, they should be properly managed. In order to disrupt
the eavesdropping without affecting the legitimate transmis-
sion, the jamming signal should be perfectly eliminated at
the legitimate users. Thus, the following conditions should be
5satisfied for i = 1; 2; : : : ; A and l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K as
u[i]yG[ij] [j] = 0; 8j = 1; 2; : : : ; A; (15)
U[l]yG[lj] [j] = 0; 8j = 1; 2; : : : ; A: (16)
Based on the interference management scheme in Section
III-A, the jamming signal should be constrained in the same
subspace of the interference at each legitimate user. In other
words, the decoding vectors u and matrices U in (15) and (16)
have been determined by the conditions (4)-(7) and should not
be changed. Thus, only the precoding matrices   should be
well designed to make (15) and (16) feasible.
When the interference from the undesired transmitters and
jamming signal from the idle SBSs can be both perfectly
eliminated at each legitimate user, the sum rate of the network
is still given by (12).
C. Distributed Algorithm to Achieve the Proposed Scheme
In the proposed scheme, UAVs and SBSs are utilized to
provide scalable video segments to their corresponding users.
For each mobile user, the interference from other SBSs and
UAVs can be eliminated perfectly by IA. In addition, the
idle SBSs can be re-utilized to generate jamming signal
to disrupt the eavesdropping, which can be perfectly zero-
forced at the legitimate users. Thus, a distributed algorithm
for UAV assisted hyper-dense networks with jamming signal
is proposed, in which the precoding matrices and decoding
vectors and matrices can be calculated iteratively. Then, the
precoding matrices   for jamming can be obtained through
zero-forcing.
In the forward direction of iterations, when we consider
the interference from other SBSs and UAVs, the interference
covariance matrices at the legitimate users can be written as
Q[i] =
KX
k=A+1
P2
d
H[ik]V[k]V[k]yH[ik]y
+
AX
a=1;a6=i
P1h[ia]h[ia]y;8i = 1; 2; : : : ; A:
(17)
Q[l] =
KX
k=A+1;
k 6=l
P2
d
H[lk]V[k]V[k]yH[lk]y
+
AX
a=1
P1h[la]h[la]y; 8l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K:
(18)
According to (18), U[l]?s for the sth data stream at the lth user
can be calculated as
U[l]?s = vs(Q
[l]); s = 1; : : : ; d; (19)
where l = A+1; A+2; : : : ;K. Then, the decoding matrix U[l]
can be obtained by combining the vectors of U[l]?s. Specially,
due to the fact that there is only one data stream transmitted
by each UAV, we have
u[i] = v1

Q[i]

; (20)
where i = 1; 2; : : : ; A.
In the reverse direction, the interference covariance matrices
can be computed as
  
Q [k]=
AX
i=1
P1
  
H [ki]  v [i]  v [i]y  H [ki]y
+
KX
l=A+1
l 6=k
P2
d
  
H [kl]
  
V [l]
  
V [l]y
  
H [kl]y; 8k=A+1; A+2; : : : ;K;
(21)
where
  
H [kj] = H[jk]y,   v [i] = u[i], and   V [l] = U[l].
According to (21),
  
U [k]?s for the sth data stream of the
reverse direction can be calculated as
  
U [k]?s = vs
  
Q [k]

; s = 1; : : : ; d; (22)
where k = A + 1; A + 2; : : : ;K. Then, the decoding matrix  
U [k] of the reverse direction can be obtained by combining
the vectors of
  
U [k]?s . Thus, we can set the precoding matrices
of the (A + 1)th SBS to the Kth SBS as V[k] =
  
U [k]. The
iterations between the forward and reverse directions continue
until the algorithm converges, which is similar to the MinIL
algorithm in [31].
Using the above process, the precoding matrices V, the
decoding vectors u and matrices U can be obtained. Based
on these solutions, we can calculate the precoding matrices
of jamming signal by zero-forcing. The jamming covariance
matrices in the reverse direction can be expressed as
  
Q [j]jam =
AX
i=1
P1
  
G [ji]  v [i]  v [i]y  G [ji]y
+
KX
l=A+1
P2
d
  
G [jl]
  
V [l]
  
V [l]y
  
G [jl]y; 8j=1; 2; : : : ; A;
(23)
where
  
G [ji] = G[ij]y.
Then, the jamming precoding matrix  [j] (j = 1; 2; : : : ; A)
can be obtained by combining the vectors  [j]?s expressed as
 
[j]
?s = vs
  
Q [j]jam

; s = 1; : : : ; djam: (24)
Thus, the distributed algorithm for the proposed scheme can
be summarized as Algorithm 1. According to [31], Algorithm
1 can be implemented distributedly in two ways. (1) The
algorithm can be implemented through communication and
training in the forward and reverse directions iteratively until
convergence, in which only local CSI needs to be estimated.
(2) If the global CSI is available at each node, precoding and
decoding matrices can be calculated at each node distributedly
following Algorithm 1.
According to the above algorithm, all the interference and
jamming signal can be eliminated perfectly at each legitimate
user when the feasibility conditions can be satisfied, which
can be performed at each node in a distributed way.
IV. FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS
In order to eliminate the interference and jamming signal
perfectly at each legitimate user, the feasibility conditions
6Algorithm 1 Distributed Algorithm for the Proposed Scheme
1: Start with arbitrary M  d matrices V[l] with V[l]V[l]y =
Id;8i = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K.
2: repeat
3: In the forward direction, calculate the interference co-
variance matrix Q[k] at the kth user according to (17)
and (18), k = 1; : : : ;K.
4: Compute the decoding matrix u[i] at the ith user and U[l]
at the lth user according to (20) and (19), respectively,
i = 1; : : : ; A, l = A+ 1; : : : ;K.
5: Reverse the direction.
  
H [kj] = H[jk]y,   v [i] = u[i], and  
V [l] = U[l].
6: Calculate
  
Q [k] according to (21), k = A+ 1; : : : ;K.
7: Compute the decoding matrix
  
U [k] according to (22),
k = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K.
8: Reverse the communication direction. V[k] =
  
U [k]; k =
A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K.
9: until convergence
10: Calculate
  
Q [j]jam according to (23), j = 1; 2; : : : ; A.
11: Compute  [j] according to (24), j = 1; 2; : : : ; A.
12: Output the solutions as V[k]; k = A+ 1; : : : ;K, u[j]; j =
1; : : : ; A, U[k]; k = A+ 1; : : : ;K and  [j]; j = 1; : : : ; A.
should be satisfied, through which the minimal number of
antennas can be obtained to achieve perfect IA. In [35],
Yetis et al. demonstrated that the feasibility conditions can be
derived by comparing the number of equations and the number
of variables. In this section, the feasibility conditions for
the proposed UAV assisted hyper-dense network are derived
first without considering jamming signal. Then, the feasibility
conditions for the jamming signal are also derived.
A. Feasibility Conditions of the UAV Assisted Network
According to Bezout’s theorem, a general polynomial sys-
tem can be solved if and only if the number of equations
does not exceed that of variables. Thus, an IA network can be
classified as feasible or infeasible by comparing the number
of equations with that of variables in [35]. Correspondingly,
the proper conditions for the proposed scheme can be derived
in Theorem 1 based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1: The total number of equations in (4)-(7) can be
calculated as
N" = A(A  1) +A(K  A)d+ (K  A)Ad
+ (K  A)(K  A  1)d2: (25)
Proof: First, the number of equations in (4) can be derived
as
N"1 = A(A  1): (26)
Then, we can obtain the number of equations in (5) as
N"2 = A(K  A)d: (27)
We can also know that the number of equations in (6) can be
denoted as
N"3 = (K  A)Ad: (28)
Besides, the number of equations in (7) can be expressed as
N"4 = (K  A)(K  A  1)d2: (29)
Thus, the total number of equations in (4)-(7) can be
calculated as
N" =N"1 +N"2 +N"3 +N"4
=A(A  1) +A(K  A)d
+ (K  A)Ad+ (K  A)(K  A  1)d2:
(30)
Lemma 2: The total number of variables in (4)-(7) can be
calculated as
Nv = A(N 1)+(K A)(N d)d+(K A)(M d)d: (31)
Proof: The total number of variables in the decoding
vectors u[i], i = 1; 2; : : : ; A, can be denoted as
Nv1 = A(N   1): (32)
The total number of variables in the decoding matrices U[l],
l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K, can be expressed as
Nv2 = (K  A)(N   d)d: (33)
In addition, the number of variables in the precoding matrices
V[k], k = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K, can be calculated as
Nv3 = (K  A)(M   d)d: (34)
Thus, the total number of variables in (4)-(7) can be caculated
as
Nv =Nv1 +Nv2 +Nv3
=A(N 1)+(K A)(N d)d+(K A)(M d)d: (35)
Theorem 1: The proper conditions of the proposed UAV
assisted hyper-dense network can be expressed as (36) (on the
next page).
Proof: According to [35], the proposed scheme is feasible
if and only if N"  Nv. Thus, according to Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, the proposed scheme is proper if and only if (37)
is satisfied (on the next page), which can be simplified as the
first inequality in (36).
Besides, each of the (A + 1)th user to the Kth user
should recover d streams transmitted by its corresponding
SBS. According to the DoF requirement of MIMO network,
the values of M and N should satisfy M  d and N  d.
Furthermore, we can notice that the solutions to (4) and
(6) only depend on the decoding matrices. Thus, the feasible
value of N can be obtained by comparing the total number of
variables in (4) and (6) with that of equations in (4) and (6).
According to Lemma 1, the total number of the equations in
(4) and (6) can be given by
N"1 +N"3 = A(A  1) + (K  A)Ad: (38)
According to Lemma 2, the total number of the variables in
(4) and (6) can be expressed as
Nv1 +Nv2 = A(N   1) + (K  A)(N   d)d: (39)
In order to make (4) and (6) solvable, the total number of their
7AN + (K  A)(M +N)d  A2 +A2d2   2A2d+K2d2   2KAd2 + 2AKd+Kd2  Ad2;
N  d+A  Ad
(K  A)d+A;
M  d:
(36)
A(N   1)+ (K A)(N  d)d+(K A)(M  d)d  A(A  1)+A(K A)d+(K A)Ad+(K A)(K A  1)d2: (37)
variables should be no less than that of their equations as
Nv1 +Nv2N"1 +N"3;
A(N 1)+(K A)(N d)dA(A 1)+(K A)Ad; (40)
which can be simplified as
N  d+A  Ad
(K  A)d+A: (41)
Therefore, from the above analysis, the proper conditions
of the proposed scheme can be derived as (36).
According to the conclusions in [35], the proper condition
is not always equivalent to the feasibility condition in IA.
Nevertheless, the proper system is feasible in most of the
cases with few counter-examples. In addition, the proposed
Algorithm 1 can also be adopted as a theoretical tool for
examining the feasibility of the proposed scheme off-line.
B. Feasibility Conditions of the Jamming Signal
In the proposed scheme, the jamming signal should be
generated by the idle SBSs to disrupt the potential eavesdrop-
ping without affecting the legitimate transmission. Thus, the
jamming signal should be constrained into the same subspace
of the interference at each user, i.e., conditions (15) and (16)
should be satisfied by designing the precoding matrices of
jamming properly.
Lemma 3: The total number of equations in (15) and (16)
can be calculated as
N jam" = A2djam +A(K  A)ddjam: (42)
Proof: The number of equations in (15) can be given as
N"5 = A2djam: (43)
In addition, the number of equations in (16) can be given as
N"6 = A(K  A)ddjam: (44)
Thus, the total number of equations in (15) and (16) can be
given as N jam" = N"5+N"6 = A2djam+A(K A)ddjam.
Lemma 4: The total number of variables in (15) and (16)
can be calculated as
N jamv = Adjam(Mjam   djam): (45)
Proof: Due to the fact that the decoding matrices in (15)
and (16) have been determined by the proposed scheme, the
effective variables in (15) and (16) only exist in the precoding
matrices  [j] for jamming signal. Thus, the total number of
variables in (15) and (16) can be derived as N jamv = Nv4 =
Adjam(Mjam   djam).
Theorem 2: The feasibility condition of the jamming signal
for the proposed scheme can be expressed as (46).
Mjam  A+ (K  A)d+ djam: (46)
Proof: It is known thatN jamv  N jam" should be satisfied
to make (15) and (16) solvable. Thus according to Lemma 3
and Lemma 4, we have Adjam(Mjam   djam)  A2djam +
A(K  A)ddjam, which can be simplified as (46).
Remark 2: The minimal number of antennas equipped at
SBSs and users to perfectly eliminate the interference between
users can be determined by the feasibility conditions in The-
orem 1. Then, based on the proposed scheme, the minimal
number of antennas to generate jamming signal, which can be
zero-forced at the legitimate users, can be determined by the
feasibility condition in Theorem 2.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE EAVESDROPPER
In the proposed scheme, the 1st to the Ath SBSs are replaced
by UAVs to provide video streaming service to mobile users,
and thus, these A SBSs can be exploited to generate jamming
signal to guarantee the security of the legitimate transmission.
Thus, in this section, the eavesdropping performance is ana-
lyzed with and without jamming signal, respectively, to show
the effectiveness of the proposed jamming design in secure
transmission3.
A. Eavesdropping Performance without Jamming Signal
As mentioned in Section, an eavesdropper with Ne antennas
exists in the UAV assisted hyper-dense network. We assume
that the CSI between the legitimate transmitters and the
eavesdropper can be obtained by the eavesdropper. However,
the CSI between the legitimate transmitters and mobile users
are unavailable at the eavesdropper, and thus, the number of
data streams for each transmitter is difficult to know at the
eavesdropper.
First, we consider the case when the eavesdropper attempts
to eavesdrop the information for the ith legitimate user served
by the UAV, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A. When decoding is performed at
3In the proposed scheme, the jamming signal can be eliminated together
with the interference between legitimate users, which will not affect the
legitimate transmission rate when feasibility conditions can be met. Thus,
we can just examine the eavesdropping rate to verify the effectiveness of
jamming signal on the secrecy rate.
8the eavesdropper, the recovered signal without jamming signal
can be expressed as
y
[i]
e 1 =u
[i]y
e h
[i]
e x
[i] +
AX
a=1;a6=i
u[i]ye h
[a]
e x
[a]
+
KX
k=A+1
u[i]ye H
[k]
e V
[k]x[k] + u[i]ye ze;
(47)
where u[i]e is Ne  1 decoding vector for the eavesdropper to
obtain the information of the ith user.
In order to eliminate the interference from other users
effectively, the following conditions should be satisfied.
u[i]ye h
[a]
e = 0; 8a = 1; 2; : : : ; A; a 6= i; (48)
u[i]ye H
[k]
e V
[k] = 0;8k = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K: (49)
To make (48) and (49) solvable, enough antennas should be
equipped at the eavesdropper. The minimal required number
of antennas by the eavesdropper is derived in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: For the eavesdropper in the proposed scheme
without jamming signal, at least (K   A)d+ A antennas are
needed to eavesdrop the ith user served by the UAV with inter-
user interference perfectly eliminated.
Proof: The total number of equations in (48) and (49)
can be expressed as
N e" 1 = (A  1) + (K  A)d: (50)
Since the precoding matrices in (49) are determined by the
proposed scheme, the effective variables in (48) and (49) only
exist in the decoding vector u[i]e of the eavesdropper, which
can be expressed as
N ev 1 = Ne   1: (51)
Therefore, (48) and (49) can be solved only when N ev 1 
N e" 1 ) Ne  (K  A)d+A.
Based on Proposition 1, we can know that the eavesdropping
rate of the ith user, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A, can be expressed as
R
[i]
e 1 = log2
 
1+
P1u
[i]y
e h[i]e h
[i]y
e u
[i]
e
2
!
: (52)
On the other hand, we consider the case when the eaves-
dropper wants to eavesdrop the lth legitimate user served
by the SBS, l = A + 1; A + 2; : : : ;K. When decoding is
performed, the recovered signal at the eavesdropper can be
written as
y
[l]
e 2 =
dX
s=1
u[l]ye H
[l]
e V
[l]
?sx
[l]
s +
AX
a=1
u[l]ye h
[a]
e x
[a]
+
KX
k=A+1
k 6=l
u[l]ye H
[k]
e V
[k]x[k] + u[l]ye ze;
(53)
where x[l]s is the sth data stream for the lth user. To eliminate
the interference from other users, the following conditions
should be satisfied:
u[l]ye h
[a]
e = 0;8a = 1; 2; : : : ; A; (54)
u[l]ye H
[k]
e V
[k] = 0; 8k = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K; l 6= k: (55)
Similar to Proposition 1, we can conclude that if we want to
eliminate the inter-user interference from other legitimate user
when eavesdropping a certain SBS served user, the following
condition should be satisfied.
Ne  (K  A  1)d+A+ 1: (56)
Nevertheless, the interference of other data streams of this user
cannot be eliminated. Therefore, the eavesdropping rate of the
lth user, l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : :K, can be calculated as
R
[l]
e 2=
dX
s=1
log2
0BBB@1+ P2u
[l]y
e H[el]V[l]?sV
[l]y
?s H
[el]yu[l]e
d2+P2
dP
i=1;i6=s
u[l]ye H[el]V[l]?iV
[l]y
?i H
[el]yu[l]e
1CCCA :
(57)
B. Eavesdropping Performance with Jamming Signal
When the jamming signal is generated by the idle SBSs,
the potential eavesdropping will be disrupted. According to
Proposition 1, when the eavesdropper is equipped with (K  
A)d+A antennas and attempts to eavesdrop the ith user served
by the UAV, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A, we can know that the interference
from other legitimate users can be eliminated. The recovered
signal at the eavesdropper can be expressed as
y
[i]
e 1 = u
[i]y
e h
[i]
e x
[i] +
AX
j=1
u[i]ye G
[j]
e  
[j]x[j]jam + u
[i]y
e ze; (58)
and the eavesdropping rate can be rewritten as
R
[i]
e 1=log2
0@1+ P1u[i]ye h[i]e h[i]ye u[i]e
2+
Pjam
djam
PA
j=1u
[i]y
e G[j]e  [j] [j]yG
[j]y
e u
[i]
e
1A :
(59)
Similarly, when the eavesdropper is equipped with (K A 
1)d + A + 1 antennas and attempts to eavesdrop the lth user
served by the SBS, l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K, the interference
from other user can be eliminated. The recovered signal at the
eavesdropper can be expressed as
y
[l]
e 2=
dX
s=1
u[l]ye H
[l]
e V
[l]
?sx
[l]
s +
AX
j=1
u[l]ye G
[j]
e  
[j]x[j]jam+u
[l]y
e ze; (60)
and the eavesdropping rate can be rewritten as (61) (on the
next page).
Remark 3: According to (52), (57), (59) and (61), we can
conclude that R[l]e 2 > R
[l]
e 2 and R
[i]
e 1 > R
[i]
e 1 for the
same number of eavesdropping antennas, due to jamming.
However, the transmission rate of the legitimate users will
not be changed by the jamming signal. Thus, the secrecy rate
of the legitimate users will be increased through introducing
the jamming signal into the network. In addition, when the
transmit power of the jamming signal Pjam becomes larger,
the secrecy rate will increase accordingly.
Next, the case when more antennas are equipped at the
eavesdropper to eliminate the jamming signal is analyzed.
According to (58) and (60), in order to eliminate the jamming
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0@1 + P2u[l]ye H[l]e V[l]?sV[l]y?s H[l]ye u[l]e
d2 + P2
Pd
i=1;i 6=s u
[l]y
e H[l]e V
[l]
?iV
[l]y
?i H
[l]y
e u
[l]
e + d
Pjam
djam
PA
j=1 u
[l]y
e G[j]e  [j] [j]yG
[j]y
e u
[l]
e
1A : (61)
signal, the following condition should be satisfied along with
(48) and (49) or (54) and (55):
u[k]ye G
[j]
e  
[j] = 0: (62)
When the eavesdropper wants to eavesdrop the information
of the ith user served by UAV, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A, (48), (49) and
(62) should be all satisfied, and the minimal required number
of antennas of the eavesdropper is derived in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: For the eavesdropper, at least (K   A)d+
A+Adjam antennas should be equipped to eavesdrop the ith
user served by UAV without interference from other users and
jamming signal, i = 1; 2; : : : ; A.
Proof: The number of equations in (62) is equal to
Adjam. Thus, according to (50), the total number of equations
in (48), (49) and (62) can be expressed as
N e" 2 = (A  1) + (K  A)d+Adaj : (63)
The total number of variables in (48), (49) and (62) can still
be expressed as (51). Thus, (48), (49) and (62) can be solved
only when N ev 2N e" 2 ) Ne  (K A)d+A+Adjam:
Similar to Proposition 2, when the eavesdropper wants to
eavesdrop the information of the lth user served by the SBS,
l = A+ 1; A+ 2; : : : ;K, at least
Ne = (K  A  1)d+A+ 1 +Adjam (64)
antennas should be equipped to eliminate the interference from
other legitimate users and jamming signal perfectly.
Remark 4: According to the above analysis, we can con-
clude that Adjam more antennas should be equipped at the
eavesdropper to successfully eavesdrop the kth user when
jamming signal is generated by the idle SBSs. In other words,
the eavesdropper should make more effort to eavesdrop the
kth user when jamming signal is generated.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, the performance of the proposed UAV as-
sisted hyper-dense small-cell network is presented and verified
through extensive simulations. We assume that the transmit
power of UAVs and SBSs are equal, i.e., P1 = P2 = Pjam =
1.
The sum rate of the small-cell network with different
numbers of M and N is shown in Fig. 3 without jamming
signal, where K = 5, A = 2, and d = 1. From the results, we
can see that the sum rate will increase linearly with SNR only
when the feasibility conditions in Theorem 1 can be satisfied,
i.e., 5N + 3M  28 and N  3, and all the interference can
be eliminated. When 5N + 3M < 28, we can see that the
sum rate of the network is much lower than that when it is
feasible, due to the residual interference. In addition, based
on the feasibility numbers of M and N , the sum rate of the
network with the jamming signal is also compared in Fig. 3 for
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Fig. 3. Sum rate comparison of the small-cell network with and without
jamming signal, with different number of antennas equipped at each SBS,
each mobile user and each jammer (K = 5, A = 2, and d = 1).
different numbers of antennas equipped at the jammers,Mjam,
when the feasibility conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied.
K = 5, A = 2, d = 1, and djam = 1. From the results,
we can see that the interference can be perfectly eliminated
and the sum rate of the network increases linearly with SNR,
only when the feasibility condition of the jamming in Theorem
2 can be satisfied, i.e., Mjam  6. In addition, we can see that
the the feasible value of Mjam only depends on A, K, d and
djam, instead of M and N .
To further verify the feasibility conditions in Theorem 1, the
interference leakage at each mobile user with different values
of M and N is compared in Fig. 4, without jamming, when
K = 5, A = 2, d = 2, and SNR=25dB. From the results,
we can note that the interference leakage can be eliminated
perfectly only when the feasibility conditions in Theorem 1
can be satisfied, i.e., 3M + 4N  38 and N  4. We can
also see that, when M becomes smaller, larger N is needed
to make it feasible.
Similarly, to verify the feasibility condition in Theorem 2,
we compare the interference leakage at each mobile user with
different values of d, djam, M and N in Fig. 5, with jamming
signal generated, when K = 5, A = 2 and SNR=25dB. From
the results, we can see that only when the feasibility condition
Mjam  A+(K A)d+djam in Theorem 2 can be satisfied,
the interference can be eliminated perfectly. In addition, we
can find that the feasible value of Mjam is only related to
the values of d, djam, K and A, and it will not be affected
by the values of M and N when the feasibility conditions in
Theorem 1 have already been satisfied.
When the eavesdropper intends to eavesdrop the legitimate
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Fig. 4. Comparison of interference leakage at each mobile user with different
values of M and N . (K = 5, A = 2, d = 2 and SNR=25dB).
5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Mjam
In
te
rfe
re
nc
e 
Le
ak
ag
e 
pe
r U
se
r (
P 1
) 
 
 
d=djam=2,M=N=6
d=djam=2,M=5,N=6
d=djam=1,M=N=6
d=djam=1,M=N=4
Fig. 5. Comparison of interference leakage at each mobile user with different
values of Mjam. (K = 5, A = 2 and SNR=25dB).
transmission of a certain UAV, the transmission and eavesdrop-
ping rate of a certain UAV served user is compared in Fig. 6
with different number of Ne, with or without jamming signal.
We also assume that the legitimate network is feasible with
K = 5, A = 2, d = 1,M = N = 4, djam = 1 andMjam = 6
according to Theorem 1. From the results, we can note that
when no jamming is generated, at least Ne = 5 antennas
are needed to perfectly eavesdrop a certain UAV served user,
which is consistent with the conclusion in Proposition 1. On
the other hand, we can also see that when jamming signal
is generated by the idle SBSs, at least Ne = 7 antennas
should be equipped at the eavesdropper to eavesdrop a certain
UAV served user, which is consistent with the conclusion
in Proposition 2. Therefore, we can conclude that additional
Adjam = 2 antennas should be equipped at the eavesdropper
to successfully eavesdrop a UAV served user when jamming
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the transmission and eavesdropping rate of a certain
SBS served user in the small-cell network without jamming signal, with
different number of Ne. (K = 3, A = 1, M = N = 4, and d = 2).
signal is generated by the idle SBSs, compared to the case
without jamming signal. In other words, the jamming signal
can make the legitimate network much securer.
In Fig. 7, the transmission and eavesdropping rate of a
certain SBS served user is compared without jamming signal,
when an eavesdropper intends to eavesdrop its transmission.
We set K = 3, A = 1, d = 2 and M = N = 4 to make the
small-cell network feasible, according to Theorem 1. From
the results, we can observe that the eavesdropping rate is very
low when Ne < 4, due to the fact the interference cannot be
perfectly eliminated at the eavesdropper, which will affect its
eavesdropping performance. When Ne  4, the eavesdropping
rate increases linearly with SNR, which has been greatly
improved, according to the conclusion in (56). However, the
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SBS served user in the small-cell network with jamming signal, with different
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djam = 2).
achieved eavesdropping rate is also lower than the transmis-
sion rate, due to the fact the the interference between data
streams of the SBS served user cannot be eliminated by the
eavesdropper. Then, similar results are provided in Fig. 8,
in which the jamming signal is considered. We set K = 3,
A = 1, d = 2, Mjam = 7, djam = 2 and M = N = 4 to
make the small-cell network feasible, according to Theorem
1 and Theorem 2. Comparing the results in Fig. 7 and Fig.
8, we can conclude that Adjam = 2 more antennas should
be equipped at the eavesdropper to eavesdrop a certain SBS
served user with jamming signal, compared to that without
jamming signal, according to the conclusion in (56) and (64).
Thus, the proposed scheme with jamming signal can make the
network much securer.
The interference leakage at the eavesdropper with different
number of Ne when the eavesdropper tries to eavesdrop a
certain UAV served user or a SBS served user, is compared in
Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, respectively. K = 5, A = 2, M = N = 6
and Mjam = 10 are set to make the legitimate network
feasible, according to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. SNR=25dB.
From the results in Fig. 9, we can see that the interference
leakage can be perfectly eliminated at the eavesdropper aiming
at a certain UAV served user, only when enough antennas
are equipped at the eavesdropper to satisfy the conditions in
Proposition 1 or Proposition 2. Especially, larger d, larger
djam can make the user more difficult to eavesdrop. From the
results in Fig. 10, we can note that the interference between
users can be perfectly eliminated at the eavesdropper aiming
at a certain SBS served user, only when enough antennas are
equipped at the eavesdropper to satisfy the conclusions in (56)
or (64). In addition, when d = 2, there exists some residual
interference, due to the fact that the interference between data
streams of the target user cannot be eliminated perfectly.
Finally, the transmission and eavesdropping rate of a tar-
geted UAV served user is compared in Fig. 11, when the
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Fig. 9. Comparison of interference leakage at the eavesdropper with different
number of Ne when the eavesdropper tries to eavesdrop a certain UAV served
user (K = 5, A = 2, M = N = 6, Mjam = 10 and SNR=25dB).
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Fig. 10. Comparison of interference leakage at the eavesdropper with
different number of Ne when the eavesdropper tries to eavesdrop a certain
SBS served user (K = 5, A = 2, M = N = 6, Mjam = 10 and
SNR=25dB).
transmit power of the jamming signal Pjam becomes larger.
K = 5, A = 2, M = N = 6, Mjam = 10 and
d = djam = 2 are set to make the scheme feasible according
to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. SNR=25dB. From the results,
we can see that when Ne < 12, the transmission of the user
cannot be perfectly eavesdropper, which is consistent with the
conclusion of Proposition 2. In addition, we can find that the
eavesdropping rate will decrease with higher Pjam or smaller
Ne. Thus, we can increase Pjam, d or djam to guarantee the
secure transmission of the legitimate network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a caching UAV assisted secure transmission
scheme has been proposed in hyper-dense small-cell networks
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Fig. 11. Comparison of a certain UAV served user’s transmission and
eavesdropping rate with different number of Ne, when the transmit power
of the jamming signal becomes larger (K = 5, A = 2, M = N = 6,
Mjam = 10, d = djam = 2 and SNR=25dB).
based on IA. In the scheme, UAVs are utilized to provide data
traffic to mobile users cooperatively with SBSs to relieve the
transmission pressure of SBSs, due to the low cost and high
mobility. Cache is equipped at each UAV to store popular
files in advance, which can be delivered to the mobile users
directly when needed at off-peak time. A single antenna is
equipped at each UAV to facilitate its transmission, and the
idea of IA is exploited to perform interference management
in the network through designing the precoding matrices of
SBS cooperatively. We derived the feasibility conditions of
the proposed scheme. In addition, we proposed to use the
idle SBSs replaced by UAVs to generate jamming signal to
disrupt the potential eavesdropping, which would not affect the
transmission of the legitimate network. Plenty of simulation
results have been presented to show the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme. In our future work, we will focus on the
optimal wireless coverage of UAVs for the small-cell network.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We thank the editor and reviewers for their detailed reviews
and constructive comments, which have greatly improved the
quality of this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] N. Wang, E. Hossain, and V. K. Bhargava, “Backhauling 5G small cells:
A radio resource management perspective,” IEEE Wireless Commun.,
vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 41–49, Oct. 2015.
[2] H. Zhang, C. Jiang, J. Cheng, and V. C. M. Leung, “Cooperative
interference mitigation and handover management for heterogeneous
cloud small cell networks,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 22, no. 3,
pp. 92–99, Jun. 2015.
[3] V. R. Cadambe and S. A. Jafar, “Interference alignment and degrees of
freedom of the K-user interference channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 3425–3441, Aug. 2008.
[4] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, M. Jin, Q. Yan, and V. C. M. Leung, “Interference
alignment and its applications: A survey, research issues, and chal-
lenges,” IEEE Commun. Surveys Tuts., vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 1779–1803,
3rd Quart. 2016.
[5] A. Dong, H. Zhang, D. Yuan, and X. Zhou, “Interference alignment
transceiver design by minimizing the maximum mean square error
for MIMO interfering broadcast channel,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.,
vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 6024–6037, Aug. 2016.
[6] F. C. Kavasoglu, Y. Huang, and B. D. Rao, “Semi-blind interference
alignment techniques for small cell networks,” IEEE Trans. Signal Proc.,
vol. 62, no. 23, pp. 6335–6348, Dec. 2014.
[7] N. Zhao, X. Liu, F. R. Yu, M. Li, and V. C. M. Leung, “Communications,
caching, and computing oriented small-cell networks with interference
alignment,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 9, pp. 29–35, Sept. 2016.
[8] F. Cheng, Y. Yu, Z. Zhao, N. Zhao, Y. Chen, and H. Lin, “Power
allocation for cache-aided small-cell networks with limited backhaul,”
IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 1272–1283, Jan. 2017.
[9] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, M. Li, Q. Yan, and V. C. M. Leung, “Physical layer
security issues in interference-alignment-based wireless networks,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 162–168, Aug. 2016.
[10] Y. Wu, R. Schober, D. W. K. Ng, C. Xiao, and G. Caire, “Secure
massive MIMO transmission with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3880–3900, Jul. 2016.
[11] F. Zhu, F. Gao, M. Yao, and H. Zou, “Joint information- and jamming-
beamforming for physical layer security with full duplex base station,”
IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 62, no. 24, pp. 6391–6401, Dec. 2014.
[12] L. Fan, S. Zhang, T. Q. Duong, and G. K. Karagiannidis, “Secure switch-
and-stay combining (SSSC) for cognitive relay networks,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 70–82, Jan. 2016.
[13] H. M. Wang, T. X. Zheng, J. Yuan, D. Towsley, and M. H. Lee,
“Physical layer security in heterogeneous cellular networks,” IEEE
Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 1204–1219, Mar. 2016.
[14] W. Wang, K. C. Teh, and K. H. Li, “Artificial noise aided physical layer
security in multi-antenna small-cell networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forens.
Security, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 1470–1482, Jun. 2017.
[15] Y. Zeng, R. Zhang, and T. J. Lim, “Wireless communications with un-
manned aerial vehicles: Opportunities and challenges,” IEEE Commun.
Mag., vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 36–42, May. 2016.
[16] L. Gupta, R. Jain, and G. Vaszkun, “Survey of important issues in UAV
communication networks,” IEEE Commun. Surv. Tuts., vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 1123–1152, 2nd Quart. 2016.
[17] S. Koulali, E. Sabir, T. Taleb, and M. Azizi, “A green strategic activity
scheduling for UAV networks: A sub-modular game perspective,” IEEE
Commun. Mag., vol. 54, no. 5, pp. 58–64, May. 2016.
[18] V. Sharma, M. Bennis, and R. Kumar, “UAV-assisted heterogeneous
networks for capacity enhancement,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 6,
pp. 1207–1210, Jun. 2016.
[19] J. Lyu, Y. Zeng, R. Zhang, and T. J. Lim, “Placement optimization
of UAV-mounted mobile base stations,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 21,
no. 3, pp. 604–607, Mar. 2017.
[20] Y. Zeng, R. Zhang, and T. J. Lim, “Throughput maximization for
UAV-enabled mobile relaying systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 64,
no. 12, pp. 4983–4996, Dec. 2016.
[21] Y. Zeng and R. Zhang, “Energy-efficient UAV communication with
trajectory optimization,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 16, no. 6,
pp. 3747–3760, Jun. 2017.
[22] M. Mozaffari, W. Saad, M. Bennis, and M. Debbah, “Optimal transport
theory for cell association in UAV-enabled cellular networks,” IEEE
Commun. Lett., to appear.
[23] M. Chen, M. Mozaffari, W. Saad, C. Yin, M. Debbah, and C. S. Hong,
“Caching in the sky: Proactive deployment of cache-enabled unmanned
aerial vehicles for optimized quality-of-experience,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas.
Commun., vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 1046–1061, May 2017.
[24] H. Liu, Z. Chen, X. Tian, X. Wang, and M. Tao, “On content-centric
wireless delivery networks,” IEEE Wireless Commun., vol. 21, no. 6,
pp. 118–125, Dec 2014.
[25] E. Bastug, M. Bennis, and M. Debbah, “Living on the edge: The role
of proactive caching in 5G wireless networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag.,
vol. 52, no. 8, pp. 82–89, Aug. 2014.
[26] Z. Zhao, M. Peng, Z. Ding, W. Wang, , and H. V. Poor, “Cluster content
caching: An energy-efficient approach to improve quality of service in
cloud radio access networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas. Commun., vol. 34,
no. 5, pp. 1207–1221, May. 2016.
[27] C. Yang, Y. Yao, Z. Chen, , and B. Xia, “Analysis on cache-enabled
wireless heterogeneous networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 131–145, Jun. 2016.
[28] M. A. Maddah-Ali and U. Niesen, “Fundamental limits of caching,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 2856–2867, May 2014.
[29] M. A. Maddah-Ali and U. Niesen, “Cache-aided interference channels,”
in Proc. IEEE ISIT’15, pp. 809–813, Hong Kong, China, Jun. 2015.
13
[30] M. Deghel, E. Bastug, M. Assaad, and M. Debbah, “On the benefits
of edge caching for MIMO interference alignment,” in Proc. IEEE
SPAWC’15, pp. 655–659, Stockholm, Sweden, Jun. 2015.
[31] K. Gomadam, V. R. Cadambe, and S. A. Jafar, “A distributed numerical
approach to interference alignment and applications to wireless interfer-
ence networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 3309–3322,
Jun. 2011.
[32] T. Xu and X. G. Xia, “A diversity analysis for distributed interference
alignment using the max-sinr algorithm,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory.
[33] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, and V. C. M. Leung, “Opportunistic communications
in interference alignment networks with wireless power transfer,” IEEE
Wireless Commun., vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 88–95, Feb. 2015.
[34] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, H. Sun, A. Nallanathan, and H. Yin, “A novel
interference alignment scheme based on sequential antenna switching
in wireless networks,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 12, no. 10,
pp. 5008–5021, Oct. 2013.
[35] C. Yetis, T. Gou, S. A. Jafar, and A. Kayran, “On feasibility of
interference alignment in MIMO interference networks,” IEEE Trans.
Signal Proc., vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 4771–4782, Sept. 2010.
[36] S. J. Kim and G. B. Giannakis, “Optimal resource allocation for MIMO
ad hoc cognitive radio networks,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 5,
pp. 3117–3131, May 2011.
[37] O. El Ayach and R. W. Heath, Jr, “Grassmannian differential limited
feedback for interference alignment,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process.,
vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 6481–6494, Dec. 2012.
[38] R. T. Krishnamachari and M. K. Varanasi, “Interference alignment under
limited feedback for MIMO interference channels,” IEEE Trans. Signal
Process., vol. 61, no. 15, pp. 3908–3917, Aug. 2013.
[39] N. Zhao, F. R. Yu, H. Sun, H. Yin, A. Nallanathan, and G. Wang,
“Interference alignment with delayed channel state information and
dynamic AR-model channel prediction in wireless networks,” Wireless
Netw., vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 1227–1242, May 2015.
[40] L. Wu and W. Zhang, “Caching-based scalable video transmission over
cellular networks,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 1156–1159,
Jun. 2016.
